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Recent Cases
PRoPJM-Y-MAWxMTABMrry OF LAN-EFFcr OF A JUDGMMNT VoID oN
ITs FA CE-Settlor transferred land in trust in 1919, providing that the
income from the land would go to his daughter for her life, remainder
to the heirs of her body. Due to economic conditions and floods, the
land failed to produce a self-sustaining income. In 1930, the life
beneficiary (who would hold the reversion by intestacy) obtained a
judgment which terminated the trust on grounds of impossibility of
performance and which vested fee simple title to the land in the life
beneficiary. The only child of the life beneficiary, a son, was made a
party to the suit. The life beneficiary then sold the land to the
defendants. In 1959, in an action to remove cloud on title, the children
of the life beneficiary (the son who had been a party in the 1930
action and a daughter who was born thereafter) prayed for the can-
cellation of the 1930 judgment which destroyed their contingent
remainders. They claimed that since the court bad no power to
destroy the contingent remainders, the judgment was void on its face.
The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were barred by laches, and
that even if the 1930 judgment were void on its face, no action in
equity would lie to vacate it.: The trial court set aside and canceled
the 1930 judgment. Held: Affirmed. The 1980 judgment was null and
void, and plaintiffs held a remainder interest in the land. Hughes v.
Neely, 332 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1960).
The court based its decision on two propositions. First, the lower
court in 1930 had no power to terminate a trust upon grounds of
impossibility of performance when the trust res was not producing
1 The general rule that no action in equity will lie to vacate a judgment void
on its face would ordinarily prevent a petitioner from bringing this action to
remove cloud on title, for a void judgment does not create a cloud on title since
it binds no one. See Annot., 78 A.L.R. 24, 73 (1932). However, the Missouri
court has adopted a unique doctrine, the Legal Acumen Doctrine, which provides
that a void judgment does create a cloud on title, thus giving equity jurisdiction,
if the invalidity is such that legal acumen is required to discover it. Merchants'
Bank v. Evans, 51 Mo. 335 (1873). The court, in declaring that the plaintiffs had
a right to bring this action, relied upon both the Legal Acumen Doctrine and Mo.
Rev. Stat. §527.150(1) (1949). This statute provides:
Any person claiming any title, estate or interest in real property...
may institute an action against any person or persons having or claim-
ing to have any title, estate or interest in such property . . . to as-
certain and determine the estate ... of said parties ... in such real
estate, and to define and adjudge by its judgment or decree the title,
estate and interest of the parties severally in and to such real property.
This appears merely to be a declaratory judgment statute, but the court did not
interpret it as such.
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any net income and when there were contingent remaindermen as
beneficiaries. The proper course would have been for the lower court
to order sale of the res and reinvestment of the proceeds by the
trustee. 2 Second, the lower court in 1930 had no power to destroy
contingent remainders in land by terminating a trust and vesting legal
title in the life tenant and reversioner (both interests being in same
person) . As statements of how substantive law should properly be
applied, there is nothing wrong with these propositions. They are
eminently sound. But to upset a thirty year old judgment where the
court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter on the
ground that substantive law was erroneously applied is another matter.
Yet this in effect is precisely what the court did.
The crux of the matter is what the court meant by its holding
that the lower court had no power to do what it did. The court did
not explain what it meant by "power," a word that eludes specific
definition.4 However, from the opinion it appears that the court, by
holding that the lower court lacked the power to terminate the trust
and destroy the contingent remainders, used the term in its negative
sense to describe the lower court's erroneous application of a sub-
stantive rule of law. The court held that the lower court's error
rendered the 1930 judgment void on its face. The Restatement of
2In support of this proposition, the court cited Restatement (Second), Trusts
§886, comment b (1959).
i 3In support of this proposition, the court cited Professor Eckhardt's conclusion
in "Destructibility of Contingent Remainders in Missouri," 6 Mo. L. Rev. 268 295
(1941), that contingent remainders are indestructible in Missouri. Professor
Eckhardt recently modified this conclusion in "Property Law in Missouri," 25 Mo.
L. Rev. 890, 892 (1960), by stating that until the present case was decided there
was no binding precedent in Missouri to the effect that a trust could not be
terminated if such termination destroyed a contingent remainder. To the contrary,
however, there was dictum in Green v. Sutton, 50 Mo. 186, 193 (1872), that a
contingent remainder which has not vested on the termination of the particular or
supporting estate will be destroyed.
The court also cited Gibson v. Gibson, 280 Mo. 519, 219 S.W. 561 (1920), in
support of its proposition that the lower court had no power to destroy the con-
tingent remainders, but that case fails as precedent since no contingent remainders
were involved.
Thus, the authorities used by the court for holding the 1930 judgment void
on its face were either not in point, or were written after the 1980 judgment was
issued. The grounds of the invalidation of the thirty year old judgment, therefore,
seem to be a bit shaky, even though based on "good" modem law.
4 Three attempts at defining power are as follows:
(1) "A power, as the word is used in this Restatement, is an ability on the part of a
person to produce a change in a given legal relation by doing or not doing a given
act." Restatement, Property §3 (1986).
(2) "The nearest synonym to power is legal ability." Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions As Applied In Judicial Reasoning," 28 Yale L.J. 16, 45 (1918).
(3) Judicial power is "the power which administers justice to the people according
to the prescribed forms of law-according to their rights as fixed by the law.
State v. Fry, 4 Mo. 120, 191 (1835).
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Judgments5 states that when a judgment is merely erroneous it is
generally not void, but only voidable. This distinction is important,
for a void judgment is subject to both direct attack and collateral
attack, while a voidable judgment is subject to direct attack only.6
A judgment is void, according to the Restatement of Judgments,
when any of the following requisites are not satisfied: first, the court
must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; second,
a reasonable method of notification must be employed; third, the
judgment must be rendered by a court with competency to render it;
and fourth, there must be a compliance with such requirements as is
necessary for the valid exercise of power by the court.7 These
requisites of a valid judgment were apparently satisfied in the 1930
action. The first requisite was met, for the lower court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the interested parties (one of whom was
the heir presumptive of the life beneficiary and the other bound by
the doctrine of virtual representation) 8 who thirty years later, in
the principal case, asked for cancellation of the 1930 judgment.
The second requisite was met for there was nothing in the record
to indicate that a reasonable method of notification had not been
employed. As to the third requisite, it seems to be question-begging,
for it appears to be the same as the jurisdictional requirement,
especially in this case in view of the court's statement that the lower
court had the right to terminate a trust where the "purposes for
which the trust is created become impossible of accomplishment."9
The fourth requisite was met, for the lower court satisfied the require-
ments necessary for the valid exercise of power on the Restatement's
terms; it had jurisdiction, the judgment was within the pleadings,
and there was no defect in the process.
The Missouri court has stated the test for determining the validity
of a judgment in more simple terms. In LaPresto v. La Presto,10 the
court said that a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of
the parties and subject matter is valid and is not open to any collateral
proceeding. However, the court went on to say that a judgment
which meets the jurisdictional requirement may be void if the record
on its face discloses that the court exceeded its jurisdiction and
rendered a particular judgment which it was wholly unauthorized
5 §4, comment a (1942).
E Ibid.
7Id., §§5-8.8 Sikemeier v. Calvin, 124 Mo. 367, 27 S.W. 551 (1894); Simes, Future
Interests §1803 (2d ed. 1956); Restatement, Property §184 (a), comment b (1936).
9 Hughes v. Neely, 332 S.W. 2d 1, 8 (Mo. 1960).
10285 S.W. 2d 568 (Mo. 1958).
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to render under the circumstances."' In support of this proposition
the court cited three Missouri cases, all of which involved judgments
which were either contrary to statutory provisions or based on issues
not made by the pleadings.' 2 In 1930, destructibility of contingent
remainders had not been abolished by statute or decision in Missouri,' 3
and the judgment terminating the trust was within the pleadings.
Such being the case, it appears that the appellate court's declaration
of the 1930 judgment as void on its face was not based upon the
usual grounds of lack of jurisdiction, but rather upon the ground that
in the lower court there was an erroneous application of what the
court in 1959 felt was the controlling substantive rule of law. To
hold the thirty year old judgment void on its face rather than voidable
and therefore subject it to collateral attack was unsound.
14
By holding the 1930 judgment void on its face, the court in effect
held that if a court without "power" terminates a trust, the person
harmed, even though a party to the lawsuit, can, thirty years later,
follow the res of the trust into the hands of a subsequent bona fide
purchaser. The most obvious consequence which emerges from such
a decision is that when a title to land contains a court judgment
somewhere in the chain of title, the land may be unmarketable.
Before a reasonably prudent man will be willing to accept the title,
every lower court judgment will have to be appealed to determine
whether the lower court properly applied the substantive law, and
even then there is no certainty that the appellate court will not find
that it itself had no "power" to do what it did. Such a procedure
would further bog down our already cumbersome land transfer
system and weaken the conclusiveness of the judicial process itself,
for it would permit persons, who had been parties to a prior
action which vested title to land in another person, to assert claims
against the land at a later time. According to the Restatement of
'l Id. at 570.
21 n Gray v. Clement, 296 Mo. 497, 246 S.W. 940 (1922), the judgment
was void on its face because it was not in compliance with the statute providing
for proceedings in partition. In Ecton v. Tomlinson, 278 Mo. 282, 212 S.W. 865
(1919), the judgment awarding alimony was void on its face because it was con-
trary to a statute providing that specific personal property could not be awarded
as alimony and cut off dower. In Burms v. Ames Realty Co., 31 S.W. 2d 274 (Mo.
App. 1930), the judgment was void on its face because it was based on issues
not raised by the pleadings.
13 See note 3, supra.
14 See Brooks v. Baker, 187 S.W. 2d 169 (Ark. 1945) and McAllister v.
Superior Court in and for Alemeda County, 28 Cal. App. 2d 160, 82 P. 2d 462
(1938), which held that where no question of jurisdiction is raised, a judgment
or decree cannot be collaterally impeached because it is inconsistent with the
finding or conclusions of law or because it appears from the record or the opinion
of the court that there was a mistake, and that the judgment should have been
different from that actually rendered.
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Judgments, where remainders are created in unborn children or
where property is limited to the heirs of a living person, an action
which would permit the unknown future owners later to re-open a
contest as to the rights in the subject matter would be against a
public policy which seeks certainty of title and marketability of
property.15 In face of this case, one would wonder what reliance
Missouri lawyers might put in the Missouri Bar's Title Standard 10:
Where a judgment or decree affecting the title to real estate has been
entered of record for more than 31 years and appears in the abstract,
but the remainder of the action either is not shown, or is incom-
pletely shown, and where such judgment or decree gives full informa-
tion as to the status of parties and the nature of the action, which is
sufficient upon which to base an opinion as to the validity of the
proceedings in question, the proceedings shall be presumed to be
valid and binding as to all matters recited in the judgment or decree,
and such showing shall be accepted as sufficient, unless something
affirmatively appears therein, showing lack of jurisdiction of either
the parties or the subject.
S. Roy Woodall, Jr.
CONSTrrmtUONAL LAw-FEEDOM OF T=E PREss-MumciPAL ORDmiNANcE
RESTRICTING Drs-mBuTroN OF HANDBILsL-Petitioner distributed hand-
bills in Los Angeles urging a boycott against specified merchants who
carried products of manufacturers alleged to be discriminatory toward
racial minorities in their employment practices. The handbills carried
only the name of "National Consumers Mobilization." Petitioner was
prosecuted under a city ordinance prohibiting distribution, in any
place and under any circumstances, of handbills which did not have
printed on them the true names and addresses of the author, dis-
tributor and sponsor.' Petitioner was convicted, fined $10 and
exhausted his remedies by appeal to the Appellate Department of
the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles which affirmed the
conviction. 2 That court rejected petitioner's seasonable contention
15 §87, comment a (1942).
1 City of Los Angeles, Calif., Municipal Code §28.06 provides:
No person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances,
which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and
address of the following:
(a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the
same.
(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided,
however, that in the case of a fictitious person or club, in addition to
such fictitious name, the true names and addresses of the owners,
managers or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also
appear thereon.2 People v. Talley, 172 Cal. App. 797; 832 P. 2d 447 (1958).
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